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A Game Model of Search and Pursuit
Steve Alpern and Viciano Lee
Abstract
Shmuel Gal and Jerome Casas have recently introduced a game
theoretic model that combines search and pursuit by a predator for
a prey animal. The prey (hider) can hide in a finite number of loca-
tions. The predator (searcher) can inspect any k of these locations.
If the prey is not in any of these, the prey wins. If the prey is found
at an inspected location, a pursuit begins which is successful for the
predator with a known capture probability which depends on the lo-
cation. We modify the problem so that each location takes a certain
time to inspect and the predator has total inspection time k. We also
consider a repeated game model where the capture probabilities only
become known to the players over time, as each successful escape from
a location lowers its perceived value capture probability.
Keywords: dynamic game, search and pursuit, predator-prey in-
teraction
1 Introduction
Traditionally, search games and pursuit games have been studied by differ-
ent people, using different techniques. Pursuit games are usually of perfect
information and are solved in pure strategies using techniques involving dif-
ferential equations. Search games, on the other hand, typically require mixed
strategies. The first attempt to combine these games was the elegant paper
of Gal and Casas (2014). In their model, a hider (a prey animal in their bi-
ological setting) begins the game by choosing among a finite set of locations
in which to hide. The searcher (a predator) then searches (or inspects) k
of these locations, where k is a parameter representing the time or energy
available to the searcher. If the hiding location is not among those inspected,
the hider wins the game. If the searcher does inspect the location containing
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the hider, then a pursuit game ensues. Each location has its own capture
probability, known to both players, which represents how difficult the pursuit
game is for the searcher. If the search-predator successfully pursues and cap-
tures the hider-prey, the searcher is said to win the game. This is a simple
but useful model that encompasses both the search and the pursuit portions
of the predator-prey interaction.
This paper has two parts. In the first part, we relax the assumption of
Gal and Casas that all locations are equally easy to search. We give each
location its own search time and we give the searcher a total search time.
Thus he can inspect any set of locations whose individual search times sum
to less than the searcher’s total search time, a measure of his resources or
energy (or perhaps the length of daylight hours, if he is a day predator).
We consider two scenario. In the first, there are an odd number of hiding
locations which as their indices increase take longer to search and have lower
probabilities of successful pursuit. In the second, we consider that there are
many hiding locations, but they come in only two types, identifiable to the
players. Locations within a type have the same search time and the same
capture probability. There may be any number of locations of each type.
The second part of the paper relaxes the assumption that the players
know the capture probability of every location precisely. Rather, we assume
that a distribution of capture probabilities is known. The players can learn
these probabilities more precisely by repeated play of the game. We analyze
a simple model with only two locations and two periods, where one location
may be searched in each period. While simple, this model shows how the
knowledge that the capture probabilities will be updated in the second period
(lowered at a location where there was a successful escape) affects the optimal
play of the game.
2 Literature Review
An important contribution of the paper of Gal and Casas discussed in the
Introduction is the determination of a threshold with respect to the number
k of locations which the searcher can inspect. If this is sufficiently high, for
example if he can inspect all locations, then the hider adopts the pure strategy
of choosing the location for which the probability of successful pursuit is the
smallest. On the other hand, if k is below this threshold (say k = 1), the hider
mixes his location so that the probability of being at a location multiplied
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by its capture probability (the desirability of inspecting such a location) is
constant over all locations.
The paper of Gal and Casas (2014) requires that the searcher knows his
resource level (total search time) k. In a related but not identical model of
Lin and Singham (2016) it is shown that sometimes the optimal searcher
strategy does not depend on k.
Alpern, Gal, and Casas (2015) extended the Gal-Casas model by allowing
repeated play in the case where the hider is found but the pursuit at his hiding
location is not successful for the searcher (pursuer). They found that the
hider should choose his location more randomly when the pursuing searcher
is more persistent.
More recently, Lidbetter and Hellerstein (2017) introduced an algorithm
similar to that of the fictitious play where the searcher recursively updates his
optimal strategy after knowing the response of the opponent’s. They apply
this technique to games similar to those we consider here. Their algorithm is
likely to prove a powerful technique for solving otherwise intractable search
games.
More generally, search games are discussed in Alpern and Gal (2006) and
search and pursuit problems related to robotics are categorized and discussed
in Chung, Hollinger and Isler (2011).
3 Single Period Game with General Search
Times
Consider a game where the searcher wishes to find the hider at one of n
locations and then attempt to pursue and capture it, within a limited amount
of resources denoted by k. Each location i has two associated parameters: a
search time ti required to search the location and a capture probability pi > 0
that if found at location i the searcher’s pursuit will be successful. Both ti
and pi are known to the searcher and the hider.
The game G (n, t, p, k) , where t = (t1, . . . , tn) and p = (p1, . . . , pn) rep-
resent the time and capture vectors, is played as follows. The hider picks
a location i ∈ N ≡ {1, 2, ..., n} in which to hide. The searcher can then
inspect search locations in any order, as long as their total search time does
not exceed k. The searcher wins (payoff = 1) if he finds and then captures
the hider; otherwise the hider wins (payoff = 0). We can say that this game
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is a constant sum game where the value V = V (k) is the probability that the
predator wins with given total search time k.
A mixed strategy for the hider is a distribution vector h ∈ H, where
H =
{
h = (h1, h2, . . . , hn) : hi ≥ 0,
n∑
1
hi = 1
}
.
A pure strategy for the searcher is a set of locations A ⊂ N which can be
searched in total time k. His pure strategy set is denoted by a(k), where
a(k) = {A ⊂ N : T (A) ≡
∑
i∈A
ti ≤ k}.
The statement above simply states that a searcher can inspect any set of lo-
cations for which the total search time does not exceed his maximum search
time k. A mixed search strategy is a probabilistic choice of these sets.
The payoff P from the perspective of the maximizing searcher is given
by
P (A, i) =
{
pi if i ∈ A, and
0 if i /∈ A.
As part of the analysis of the game, we may wish to consider the best
response problem faced by a searcher who knows the distribution h of the
hider. The ”benefit” of searching each location i is given by bi = hi pi, the
probability that he finds and then captures the hider (prey). Thus when
h is known, the problem for the searcher essentially is to choose the set
of locations A ∈ α (k) which maximizes b(A) =
∑
i∈A bi. This is a classic
Knapsack problem from the Operations Research literature. The objects to
be put into the knapsack are the locations i. Each has a ‘weight’ ti and a
benefit bi. He wants to fill the knapsack with as much total benefit subject
to a total weight restriction of k.
The knapsack approach illustrates a simple domination argument: the
searcher should never leave enough room (time) in his knapsack to put in
another object. We write this simple observation as follows.
Lemma 1 Fix k. The set A ∈ α (k) is weakly dominated by the set A′ ∈ α (k)
if A ⊂ A′ and there is a location j ∈ A′ −A.
Proof. If i in both A or i is not in A′, then P (A, i) = P (A′, i) . If i ∈ A′−A
then P (A′, i) = pi > 0 = P (A, i) .
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3.1 An example
To illustrate the general game we consider an example with n = 4 locations.
The search times are given by t = (5, 3, 4, 7) and the respective capture prob-
abilities are given by p = (.1, .2, .15, .4) . In this example it is easiest to name
the locations by their search time, so for example the capture probability at
location 7 is 0.4. The searcher has total search time given by k = 7, so he
can search any single location or the pair {3, 4} . The singleton sets {3} and
{4} are both dominated by {3, 4} . We put the associated capture time next
to the name of each location. Thus the associated reduced matrix game is
simply
A\location 5 (.1) 3 (.2) 4 (.15) 7 (.4)
{5} .1 0 0 0
{7} 0 0 0 .4
{3, 4} 0 .2 .15 0
Solving the matrix game shows that the prey hides in the four locations
with probabilities (12/23, 0, 8/23, 3/23) while the searcher inspects {5} with
probability 12/23, {7} with probability 3/23, and {3, 4} with probability
8/23. The value of the game, that is, the probability that the predator-
searcher finds and captures the prey-hider, is 6/115. Our approach in this
paper is not to solve games in the numerical fashion, but rather to give
general solutions for certain classes of games, as Gal and Casas did for the
games with ti = 1.
3.2 The game with ti constant
Choosing all the search times ti the same, say 1, we may restrict k to in-
tegers. This is the original game introduced and solved by Gal and Casas
(2014). Since the ti are the same, we may order the locations by their cap-
ture probabilities, either increasing or decreasing. Here we use the increasing
order of the original paper. Clearly if k = 1 the hider will make sure that
all the locations are equally good for the searcher (pih (i) =constant) and if
k = n the hider knows he will be found so he will choose the location with
the smallest capture probability (here location 1). The nice result says that
there is a threshold value for k which divides the optimal hiding strategies
into two extreme types. (The search strategies use concepts not relevant to
this paper.)
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Proposition 2 (Gal-Casas) Consider the game G (n, t, p, k) where ti = 1
for all i and the locations are ordered so that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn. Define
λ =
∑
i=1,n
1/pi. The value of this game is given by min (kλ, p1) . If k < p1/λ
then the unique optimal hiding distribution is h (i) = λ/pi, i = 1, . . . , n. If
k ≥ p1/λ then the unique optimal hiding strategy is to hide at location 1.
3.3 The game with ti = i, pi decreasing, k = n odd.
We now consider games with ti = i and pi decreasing. In some sense locations
with higher indices i are better for the hider in that they take up more search
time and have a lower capture probability. Indeed if the searcher has enough
resource k to search all the locations (k =
∑
i=1,n ti = n (n+ 1) /2) then of
course the hider should simply hide at location n and keep the value down to
pn. In fact this solution obtains for much smaller values of k, as can be seen
below in Table 1, where k = 10 (rather than 15) suffices. Note that if k < n,
the hider can win simply by hiding at location n, which takes time tn = n
to search. We give a complete solution for the smallest nontrivial amount of
resources (total search time) of k = n.
Proposition 3 Consider the game G (n, t, p, k) , where ti = i, pi is decreas-
ing in i and k = n = 2m+ 1. Then
1. An optimal strategy for the searcher is to choose the set {j, n− j} with
probability 1/ (pj S (p)) for j = m+1, . . . , n, where S(p) =
∑2m+1
j=m+1 1/pj.
2. An optimal strategy for the hider is to choose location j with probability
h¯ (j) = 1/ (pjS (p)) for j ≥ m + 1 and not to choose locations j ≤ m
at all.
3. The value of the game is V = 1
S(p)
.
Proof. Suppose the searcher adopts the strategy suggested above. Any
location i that the hider chooses belongs to one of the sets of the form
{j, n− j} for j = m + 1, . . . , n, where the set {n, 0} denotes the set {n} .
Since for j ≥ m + 1 we have j > n − j and the pi are decreasing, the
hider is better off choosing location j. In this case he is found with prob-
ability 1/ (pj S (p)) and hence he is captured with probability at least pj
(1/ (pj S (p))) = 1/S (p) .
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Suppose the hider adopts the hiding distribution suggested above. Note
that no pure search strategy can inspect more than one of the locations
j ≥ m + 1. Suppose that location j is inspected. Then the probability that
the searcher finds and captures the hider is given by h¯ (j) ∗ pj = 1/ (pjS (p))
pj = 1/S (p) . It follows that S (p) is the value of the game.
Corollary 4 Assuming the pi are strictly decreasing in i, the hider strategy
h¯ given above is uniquely optimal, but the searcher strategy is not.
Proof. Let h∗ 6= h¯ be a hiding distribution. We must have h∗ (j) +
h∗ (n− j) > h¯ (j)+h¯ (n− j) = 1/ (pjS (p)) for some j ≥ m+1; otherwise the
total probability given by h∗ would be less than 1. Against such a distribution
h∗, suppose that the searcher inspects the two locations j and n − j. Then
the probability that the searcher wins is given by pjh
∗ (j)+ pn−jh
∗ (n− j) ≥
pj (h
∗ (j) + h∗ (n− j)) because pj < pn−j. But by our previous estimate
h∗ (j) + h∗ (n− j) > 1/ (pjS (p)) this means the searcher wins with prob-
ability at least pj (1/ (pjS (p))) = 1/S (p) and hence h
∗ is not optimal.
Next, consider the searcher strategy which gives the same probability as
above for all the sets {j, n− j} for j ≥ m+2 but gives some of the probability
assigned to {m+ 1, m} to the set {m+ 1, m− 1} . Let’s say the probability
of {m+ 1, m− 1} is a small positive number ε. The total probability of
inspecting location m + 1 (and all larger locations) has not changed. The
probability of inspecting location m has gone down by ε. So the only way
the new searcher strategy could fail to be optimal is potentially when the
hider chooses location m. In this case the probability that the searcher wins
is given by
((1/ (pm+1 S (p)))− ε) pm.
Comparing this to the value of the game, we consider the difference
((1/ (pm+1 S (p)))− ε) pm −
1
S (p)
=
pm − pm−1
pm S (p)
− εpm.
Since the first term on the right is positive because pm > pm−1, the difference
will be positive for sufficiently small positive ε.
We will now consider an example to show how the solution changes as k
goes up from the solved case of k = n to the level where the hider just goes
to location n. To determine that level we use the following idea.
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Proposition 5 The game G (n, p, t, k) has value v = pn if and only if the
value v′ of the game G (n− 1, (p1, . . . , pn−1) , (1, 2, . . . , n− 1) , k − n) (with
the last location removed and resources reduced by n) is at least pn.
Proof. Suppose v = pn. Every search set with positive probability must
include location n, otherwise simply hiding there implies v < pn. So the re-
maining part of every search set has k′ = k−n.With this amount of resources,
the searcher must find the hider in the first n locations with probability at
least pn, which is what is stated in the Proposition. Otherwise, the searcher
will either have to not search location n certainly (which gives v < pn) or not
search the remaining locations with enough resources to ensure v ≥ pn.
Example: Consider the example where p = (.5, .4, .3, .2, .1) with k =
10, n = 5. Here pn = .1 . The game with p
′ = (.5, .4, .3, .2) and k′ = k−n = 5
has value at least .1 because of the equiprobable search strategy of {1, 4}
and {2, 3} . Here each location in the new game is inspected with the same
probability 1/2 and consequently the best the hider can do is to hide in the
best location 4, and then the searcher wins with probability (1/2) (.2) = .1. If
follows from Proposition 5 that the original game has the minimum possible
value of v = pn = p5 = .1 .
To illustrate Proposition 3 and Corollary 4, we consider the above game
where k = n = 5, ti = i, and p = (.5, .4, .3, .2, .1) . The game matrix, exclud-
ing dominated search strategies, is given by
A\location 1 2 3 4 5
{5} 0 0 0 0 .1
{1, 4} .5 0 0 .2 0
{2, 3} 0 .4 .3 0 0
{1, 3} .5 0 .3 0 0
{1, 2} .5 .4 0 0 0
The unique solution for the optimal hiding distribution is (0, 0, 2/11, 3/11, 6/11)
and the value is 6/110 = 1/ (1/.3 + 1/.2 + 1/.1) ≃ .055 . The optimal search
strategy mentioned in Proposition 3 is to play {5} , {1, 4} and {2, 3} with
respective probabilities 6/11, 3/11 and 2/11. Another strategy is to play {5}
and {1, 4} the same but to play {2, 3} and {1, 3} with probabilities 3/22 and
1/22. It is of interest to see how the solution of the game changes when k
increases from k = n = 5 to higher values. We know that we need go no
higher than k = 10 from Proposition 5 because in the game on locations 1 to
4 with k′ = 10− 5 = 5, the searcher can inspect {4, 1} with probability 2/3
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and {3, 2} with probability 1/3 to ensure winning with probability at least
1/10 = p5.
So we know the solution of the game for k = 5 and k ≥ 10. The following
table gives the value of the game and the unique optimal hiding distribution
for these and intermediate values. (The optimal search strategies are varied
and we don’t list them, though they are easily calculated.)
k\i 1 2 3 4 5 Value
5 0 0 2/11 3/11 6/11 3/55 ≃ 0.0545
6 0 0 2/11 3/11 6/11 3/55 ≃ 0.0545
6 0 0 0 1/3 2/3 1/15 ≃ 0.06 67
8 0 0 0 1/3 2/3 1/15 ≃ 0.06 67
9 0 3/37 4/37 6/37 24/37 18/185 ≃ 0.0943
≥ 10 0 0 0 0 1 1/10 = 0.1
Table 1. Optimal hiding distribution and values, k ≥ 5.
We know that the value must be nondecreasing in k, but we see that it is not
strictly increasing. Roughly speaking (but not precisely), the hider restricts
towards fewer and better locations as k increases, staying always at the best
location 5 for k ≥ 10. However there is the anomalous distribution for k = 9
which includes sometime hiding at location 2.
3.4 Game with two types of locations
Suppose there are two types of locations (hiding places). Type 1 takes time
t1 = 1 (this is a normalization) to search, while type 2 takes time t2 = τ
to search, with τ being an integer. Now let type 1 locations have capture
probability p while type 2 locations have capture probability q. Moreover,
suppose there are a locations of type 1 and b locations of type 2. The searcher
has total search time k. To simplify our results we assume that k is small
enough such that a ≥ k (the searcher can restrict all his searches to type 1)
and bτ ≥ k (he can also restrict all his searches to type 2 locations).
Let m = ⌊k/τ⌋ be the maximum number of type 2 locations that can
be searched. The searcher’s strategies are to search j = 0, 1, . . . , m type 2
locations (and hence k − τj locations of type 1). Since all locations of a
given type are essentially the same, the decision for the hider is simply the
probability y to hide at a randomly chosen location of type 1 (and hence hide
at a randomly chosen location of type 2 with probability 1− y).
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Then the probability P (j, y) that the searcher wins the game is given by
yp(
k − τj
a
)− (1− y)q(
j
b
)
=
k
a
py +
(q
b
(1− y)−
1
a
pyτ
)
j
This will be independent of the searcher’s strategy j if
q
b
(1− y)−
1
a
pyτ = 0, or
y = y¯ ≡
aq
aq + bpτ
For y = y¯, the capture probability is given by
P (j, y¯) =
pqk
aq + bpτ
By playing y = y¯, the hider ensures that the capture probability (payoff)
does not exceed P (j, y¯).
We now consider how to optimize the searcher’s strategy. Suppose the
searcher searches j locations of type 2 with probability xj , j = 0, 1, . . . , m.
If the hider is at a type 2 location then he is captured with probability
m∑
j=0
xj
qj
b
=
q
b
m∑
j=0
jxj =
q
b
ˆ, where
ˆ =
m∑
j=0
jxj
is the mean number of searches at type 2 locations. Similarly, if the hider is
at a type 1 location, the hider is captured with probability
m∑
j=0
xj
p(k − τj)
a
=
pk
a
−
pτ
a
m∑
j=0
jxj
=
pk
a
−
pτ
a
ˆ
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It follows that the capture probability will be the same for hiding at either
location if we have
q
b
ˆ =
pk
a
−
pτ
a
ˆ, or,
ˆ =
pbk
bpτ + aq
.
So for any probability distribution over the pure strategies j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m}
with mean ˆ, the probability of capturing a hider located either at a type 1
or a type 2 location is given by
q
b
ˆ =
pk
a
−
pτ
a
ˆ =
pqk
aq + bpτ
To summarize, we have shown the following.
Proposition 6 Suppose all the hiding locations are of two types: a locations
of type 1 with search time 1 and capture probability p; b locations of type
2 with search time τ and capture probability q. Suppose a and b are large
enough so the Searcher can do all his searching at a single location type,
that is, k ≤ max(a, τb). Then the unique optimal strategy for the hider is
to locate in a random type 1 location with probability y¯ = aq
aq+bpτ
and in a
random type 2 location with probability 1 − y¯. Note that this is independent
of k. A strategy for the Searcher which inspects j locations of type 2 (and
thus, k− jτ for type 1) with probability xj is optimal if and only if the mean
number ˆ =
∑m
j=0 jxj , m = ⌊k/τ⌋ of type 2 locations inspected is given by
ˆ = pbk
bpτ+aq
. If this number is an integer, then the Searcher has an optimal
pure strategy. The value of the game is given by pqk
aq+bpτ
.
4 Game Where Capture Probabilities are Un-
known But Learned
In this section we determine how the players can learn the values of the cap-
ture probabilities over time, starting with some a priori values and increas-
ing these at locations from which there have been successful escapes. This
of course requires that the game is repeated. Here we consider the simplest
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model, just two rounds. So after a successful escape in the second round,
we consider that the hider-prey has won the game (Payoff 0). More rounds
of repeated play are considered in Gal, Alpern,Casas (2015), but learning is
not considered there.
To introduce the complication of learning the escape probabilities, we
further simplify the model to two hiding locations, one of which may be
searched in each of the two rounds. If the Hider is found at location i; he is
captured with a probability 1− qi (escapes with complementary probability
qi). There are two rounds. If the Hider is not found (Searcher looks in the
wrong location) in either round, he wins and the payoff is 0: If the Hider
is found and captured in either round, the Searcher wins and the payoff is
1: If the Hider is found but escapes in the first round, the game is played
one more time and both players remember which location the Hider escaped
from. If the Hider escapes in the second (final) round, he wins and the payoff
is 0.
The novel feature here is that the capture probabilities must be learned
over time. At each location, the capture probability is chosen by Nature
before the start of the game, independently with probability 1/2 of being h
(high) and probability 1/2 and being l (the low probability), with h > l. In
the biological scenario, this may be the general distribution of locations in
a larger region in which it is easy or hard to escape from. A more general
distribution is possible within our model, but this two point distribution is
very easy to understand. If there is escape from location i in the first round,
then in the second round the probability that the capture probability at i
is h goes down (to some value less than 1/2). This is a type of Bayesian
learning, which only takes place after an escape, and only at the location of
the escape.
4.1 Normal form of the two-period learning game
We use the normal form approach, rather than a repeated game approach.
A strategy for either player says where he will search/hide in the two periods
(assuming the game goes to the second period). Due to the symmetry of the
two locations, both player cannot but choose their first period search or hide
locations randomly. Thus the players have two strategies: rs (random,same)
and rd (random,different). If there is a successful escape from that location,
they can either locate in the same location (strategy rs) or the other loca-
tion (strategy rd). This gives a simple two by two matrix game. In this
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subsection we calculate its normal form; in the next subsection we present
the game solution.
First we compute the payoff for the strategy pair (rs, rs): Half the time
they go to different locations in first period, in which case the hider wins
and the payoff is 0. So we ignore this, put in a factor of (1/2), and assume
they go to the same location in the first period. There is only one location
to consider, suppose it has escape probability x. Then, as they both go back
to this location in the second period if the hider escapes in the first period,
the expected payoff is given by
Px(rs, rs) = (1/2) ((1− x)1 + x(1 − x)) (1)
Since x takes values l and h equiprobably we have
P (rs, rs) =
Ph(rs, rs) + Pl(rs, rs)
2
=
2− h2 − l2
4
(2)
It is worth noting two special cases: If both escape probabilities are 1 (escape
is certain), the the hider always wins and the payoff is 0. If both escape
probabilities are 0 then the searcher wins if and only if they both choose the
same location, which has probability 1/2.
Next we consider the strategy pair (rd, rd). Here we can assume they
both go to location 1 in the first period (hence we add the factor of 1/2) and
location 2 in the second period. The escape probabilities at these ordered
locations 1 and 2 can be any of the following: hh, ll, hl, lh. The first two are
straightforward as it is the same as going to the same location twice (already
calculated in (2)). We list the calculation of the four ordered hiding location
below, where Px is given in (1).
Phh(rd, rd) = Ph(rs, rs)
Pll(rd, rd) = Pl(rs, rs)
Plh(rd, rd) = (1/2)((1− l)1 + l(1− h))
Phl(rd, rd) = (1/2)((1− h)1 + h(1− l))
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Taking the average of these four values gives,
P (rd, rd) =
4− h2 − l2 − 2hl
8
=
4− (h+ l)2
8
. (3)
Now consider the strategy pair (rs, rd). If they go to different locations in
the first period, the game ends with payoff 0. So again, we put in factor of
1/2 and assume they go to same location in first period. This means that if
an escape happens in the first period, the hider wins (payoff 0) in the second
period. So the probability the searcher wins is
P (rs, rd) = P (rd, rs) = (1/2)
(
1/2((1− h) + (1− l))
)
=
2− (h + l)
4
(4)
Thus, we have completed the necessary calculations and the game matrix for
for the strategy pairs rs and rd, with Searcher as the maximizer.
To solve this game, we begin with the game matrix from the Section 4.1.
A = A(l, h) =
[
P (rs, rs) P (rs, rd)
P (rd, rs) P (rd, rd)
]
=
[
2−(h2+l2)
4
2−(h+l)
4
2−(h+l)
4
4−(h+l)2
8
]
. Clearing fractions, we have
8A =
[
−2h2 − 2l2 + 4 4− 2h− 2l
4− 2h− 2l 4− (h+ l)2
]
8A− (4− 2h− 2l)
[
1 1
1 1
]
= Y =
[
−2h2 + 2h− 2l2 + 2l 0
0 2h+ 2l − (h+ l)2
]
.
V
(
8A− (4− 2h− 2l)
[
1 1
1 1
])
= V (Y ) =
1
1
−2h2+2h−2l2+2l
+ 1
2h+2l−(h+l)2
.
This follows from the simple formula for the value of diagonal matrix games,
V
([
a 0
0 b
])
= 1/ (1/a+ 1/b) . We also know that in this diagonal game,
players adopt each strategy with a probability inversely proportional to its
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diagonal element,
in particular they should choose rs and rd with probabilities (V/a, V/b) .
(5)
Hence the value of our game matrix A is given by
V (A) =
1
2
−
1
4
l −
1
4
h−
1
8
(
1
2h2−2h+2l2−2l
− 1
2h+2l−(h+l)2
) .
We can now see that, as expected, a successful escape from a location makes
that location more attractive to the hider as a future hiding place. This is
confirmed in the following.
Proposition 7 In the learning game when l < h, after a successful escape
both players should go back to the same location with probability greater than
1/2.
Proof. Let a and b denote, as above, the diagonal elements of Y. We have
a− b =
(
−2h2 + 2h− 2l2 + 2l
)
−
(
2h + 2l − (h + l)2
)
= − (h− l)2 < 0.
This means that b > a and V/a > V/b. Hence by the observation (5) the
strategy rs should be played with a higher probability (V/a) than rd (prob-
ability V/b), in particular with probability more than 1/2.
4.2 An example with l = 1/3 and h = 2/3
A simple example is when the low escape probability is l = 1/3 and the high
escape probability is h = 2/3: This give the matrix A as
A(l, h) =
[
13
36
1
4
1
4
3
8
]
with value V = V (1/3, 2/3) = 21/68, and where each of the player optimally
plays rs with probability 9/17 and rd with probability 8/17.
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Suppose there is an escape in the first period at say location 1. Then in
the second period the Hider goes to location 1 with probability 9/17. Since
the subjective probability of capture at location 2, from the point of view of
either player, remains unchanged at (1/3 + 2/3) /2 = 1/2; this corresponds
to a certain probability x at location 1, that is, a matrix[
x 0
0 1/2
]
We then have that
(9/17)x = (8/17)(1/2) or,
x = 4/9.
This corresponds to the probability of escape probability l = 1/3 of q, where
q1/3 + (1− q)2/3 = 4/9 or,
q = 2/3.
Thus, based on the escape at location 1 in the first period, the subjective
probability that the escape probability there is 1/3 has gone up from the
initial value of 1/2 to the higher value of 2/3.
5 Summary
The breakthrough paper of Gal and Casas (2014) gave us a model in which
both the search and pursuit elements of predator-prey interactions could be
modeled together in a single game. In that paper the capture probabilities
depended on the hiding location but the time required to search a location
was assumed to be constant. In the first part of this paper, we drop that
simplifying assumption. We first consider a scenario in which the search
times increase in i while the capture probabilities decrease. We solve this
game for the case of a particular total search time of the searcher. We then
consider a scenario where there are many hiding locations but they come in
only two types. Locations of each type are identical in that they have the
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same search times and the same capture probabilities. We solve the resulting
search-pursuit game.
In the second part of the paper we deal with the question of how the play-
ers (searcher-predator and hider-prey) learn the capture probabilities of the
different locations over time. We adopt a simple Bayesian approach. After a
successful escape from a given location, both players update their subjective
probabilities that it is a location with low or high capture probability; the
probability that it is low obviously increases. In the game formulation, the
players incorporate into their plan the knowledge that if there is an escape,
then that location becomes more favorable to the hider in the next period.
While this paper gives a formal mathematical analysis of some search-
pursuit problems, we believe it will also have applications in actual predator-
prey scenarios.
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